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SCOTUS hearing argument on sentencing enhancement and lenity
The Court is hearing argument in Burgess v. United States (Transcript here: tinyurl.com/2smcon )
Duke Law School briefing info: tinyurl.com/34of8p).
The briefs are here: tinyurl.com/2rf8qy [middle of the page])
Docketing info here: tinyurl.com/2n8m3l
This is a sentencing enhancement matter with the Court seeking to settle conflict among the courts regarding federal drug statutes. Defendant Keith Burgess pled guilty to conspiracy to commit a drug offense. The lower court sentenced him based on the federal sentencing enhancement provision which establishes a mandatory minimum of 20 years' imprisonment based on the presence of prior felony drug convictions. Defendant Burgess had a misdemeanor state conviction for cocaine possession.
Of interest ( and central to this case) is the fact that “Felony” is not currently subject to clear definition because the Federal Code uses the world in two conflicting ways. One is that where the criminal code (state or federal) itself calls a crime a “felony.” The other is where a crime is punishable by more than one year in prison. The Cocaine misdemeanor that Burgess was convicted of carried a two year maximum sentence.
In the instant matter Defendant Burgess is seeking the to have the Court hold the federal law as ambiguous as to what is a felony and apply the lenity rule regarding the definition of a felony, and to apply the rule of lenity to resolve the ambiguity in Burgess' favor.
The Rule of Lenity is such that when there is ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes that it should be resolved in favor of lenity. The rule is not to be applied where to do so would conflict with the implied or express intent of Congress, but the rule provides a time-honored interpretative guideline when the congressional purpose is unclear. Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812, 91 S.Ct. 1056, 1059, 28 L.Ed.2d 493 (1971); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437, 98 S.Ct. 2864, 2873 (1978); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-348, 92 S.Ct. 515, 522-523, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971); Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83, 75 S.Ct. 620, 622, 99 L.Ed. 905 (1955); United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221-222, 73 S.Ct. 227, 229-230, 97 L.Ed. 260 (1952); Liparota v. U.S., 471 U.S. 419, 105 S.Ct. 2084 ( 1985); U.S. v. Shibani, 513 U.S. 10, 115 S.Ct. 382 (1994).
The Court is hearing argument in Burgess v. United States (Transcript here: tinyurl.com/2smcon )
Duke Law School briefing info: tinyurl.com/34of8p).
The briefs are here: tinyurl.com/2rf8qy [middle of the page])
Docketing info here: tinyurl.com/2n8m3l
This is a sentencing enhancement matter with the Court seeking to settle conflict among the courts regarding federal drug statutes. Defendant Keith Burgess pled guilty to conspiracy to commit a drug offense. The lower court sentenced him based on the federal sentencing enhancement provision which establishes a mandatory minimum of 20 years' imprisonment based on the presence of prior felony drug convictions. Defendant Burgess had a misdemeanor state conviction for cocaine possession.
Of interest ( and central to this case) is the fact that “Felony” is not currently subject to clear definition because the Federal Code uses the world in two conflicting ways. One is that where the criminal code (state or federal) itself calls a crime a “felony.” The other is where a crime is punishable by more than one year in prison. The Cocaine misdemeanor that Burgess was convicted of carried a two year maximum sentence.
In the instant matter Defendant Burgess is seeking the to have the Court hold the federal law as ambiguous as to what is a felony and apply the lenity rule regarding the definition of a felony, and to apply the rule of lenity to resolve the ambiguity in Burgess' favor.
The Rule of Lenity is such that when there is ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes that it should be resolved in favor of lenity. The rule is not to be applied where to do so would conflict with the implied or express intent of Congress, but the rule provides a time-honored interpretative guideline when the congressional purpose is unclear. Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812, 91 S.Ct. 1056, 1059, 28 L.Ed.2d 493 (1971); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437, 98 S.Ct. 2864, 2873 (1978); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-348, 92 S.Ct. 515, 522-523, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971); Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83, 75 S.Ct. 620, 622, 99 L.Ed. 905 (1955); United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221-222, 73 S.Ct. 227, 229-230, 97 L.Ed. 260 (1952); Liparota v. U.S., 471 U.S. 419, 105 S.Ct. 2084 ( 1985); U.S. v. Shibani, 513 U.S. 10, 115 S.Ct. 382 (1994).
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