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Re: sue blackmore on free will (MP3)
Wed, July 30, 2008 - 2:39 PMOk, I have a big fat crush on Sue, but I didn't find the argumentation presented in this talk all that convincing.
When one of them raised the issue of quantum indeterminacy, they quickly and rightly pointed out that on its face, this doesn't help us get to free will at all. And then they moved on. What they neglected to mention is that it doesn't help the case for determinism either. This is a wild card for both theories. I'm no physicist so I don't know what this will all come to, but it's one angle from which to examine the possibility that neither the proponent of free will or the advocate of determinism has got it exactly right.
Free will and determinism are very old categories and they may not be mutually exclusive, they may not even be mutually exhaustive, and it's possible that neither is terribly useful as an explanation of behavior. Daniel Dennett has argued that once we unpack the concept of free will in a way that makes sense (i.e. revise it) we can make a good scientific case for it, whereas Patricia Churchland has argued that the problem of free will vs. determinism as usually conceived is insoluble, and instead we should look at it in terms of the organism being more or less "in control."
I like Churchland's approach because it gets us further from speculative metaphysics and closer to something that can be operationally defined and manipulated. -
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Re: sue blackmore on free will (MP3)
Wed, July 30, 2008 - 5:20 PMi think they should question why people don't like them for saying what they say more, and maybe then they will see a function of the notion of free will they missed: social tracking of responsibility, whatever or whoever the cause.
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Re: sue blackmore on free will (MP3)
Wed, July 30, 2008 - 4:50 PM
I just listed to this Sue Blackmore audio on free will.
My experience of consciousness is that it is rising not the mind.
For example, my stomach desires certain food, the tung desires other food, and the mind with it's streams of thoughts, processes, and memory banks, as well the effects from the sensory-world comes up with various subtle impressions which their summation takes on an action, a movement... and I think that is what most people are considering free will... I do not consider that free will.
And within our mind we have objections, ethics, beliefs, and other such "structures" those structures allows us to build intellect and make more educated decisions of what actions we prevent ourselves from. Yet our impulses aren't free.
My experience of consciousness is that it rises from a place of just awareness, and behind that awareness is where there is this sense of true-Self. That true Self, inner-Soul, or whatever you may want to call it, is where out of that void/nothingness space an intention rises. Here, from my experience it seems that out of Self becoming cognizant of itself through consciousness, i.e. consciousness becoming cognizant of consciousness, the sense of real Self becomes born. From that place, we can begin taking actions beyond causality.
It also opens the gates to allow the mind go fully insane as it's no longer the ground for sanity. The mind realizes that it is a nobody, it can not do anything, it does not know and will never know. The mind realizes there is no free will, as will doesn't rise from mind.
I also wonder if anyone knows any research in the "para" realm with regards to free-will has been conducted on those who practice Samadhi meditation practices like Tibettan Lama/Rinpoche's, Yogi's, etc?
I recall some 10 years ago I read online about a research that was conducted on the brain waves of Tibetan Monks who would hold a small wired remote with a button on it. They were to push the button when they would enter Samadhi. During that research they found that the brains of these monks in that state was running at a radically different frequency... where normal people are between these alpha/beta/gamma/delta states which were ranging all less than 10hz (I'm speaking from memory, so this is all fragmented info... and I may be completely wrong on the numbers here) but that the frequency for their state was radically higher to something like 50hz.
I think that there is humility in realizes there is no free-will when it comes to the mind. I also feel that it's sad and unfortunate to humanity for not realizing the deeper dimensions of consciousness leading to Self.
I certainly don't expect to be able to tie a knot for others between spirituality and science... though at least for my own discovery and harmony of knowledge I seek my best effort hehe. -
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Re: sue blackmore on free will (MP3)
Thu, July 31, 2008 - 11:21 PM"The mind realizes that it is a nobody, it can not do anything, it does not know and will never know."
if it is so ineffectual, why does it exist? what's left when the dust settles?
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Re: sue blackmore on free will (MP3)
Wed, July 30, 2008 - 11:20 PMThanks - one of the most refreshing talks I've heard in a while. I'd say she presented one of the closest renditions to the conclusions I've come to myself. -
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Re: sue blackmore on free will (MP3)
Thu, July 31, 2008 - 12:33 AMi have some concerns, tactically and rhetorically. what i suppose i want to keep no matter what is a way to talk about these important matters:
1) why some decisions are better than others, and how to make better decisions
2) how to identify responsibility vs. people trying to get away with something by making up rationalizations and excuses. people do in fact lie and fudge about motivation, and though we can certainly move up a level and agree that the excuses and rationalizations are themselves determined and not "freely willed," this ends up handcuffing some of the ways we talk about these fine gradients.
we might also look at this issue in anatomical terms. what we call "free will" is entirely fronto-temporal activity. we ascribe more freedom to activities in these regions, and i think with some good reasons sometimes. being able to represent a hypothetical activity and subject it to social and logical analysis for validity is cool. if you do it right, you can really fine-tune your decisions to matching the specifics of a situation. instead of talking about "determined" vs. "undetermined" or "caused" vs. "free" we can talk about the granularity in accuracy of a given computational response. reflecting no my amygdala, for example, i see a fairly blunt instrument, with a smaller vocabulary of response than the incredible combinations of words i can generate in consciousness to describe my environment and desires for action. i don't think this is merely smug conscious narcissism, though it could be at times.
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Re: sue blackmore on free will (MP3)
Thu, July 31, 2008 - 2:06 AMA decision might be better described as support for the belief in a preexisting better outcome - all decisions are a product of forces based on what's going down then.
The propensity for rationalizations and excuses, and whether or not they are part of the equation are merely variables in the matrix of factors determining our awareness (or not) of a moment. A person doesn't lie, as much as a person is a vehicle through which the apparent action of a lie might be construed as such after the fact.
I question the concept that "you can really fine-tune your decisions to matching the specifics of a situation". In theory, at least, there is really nobody there to fine-tune them. The fine-tuning in itself is the unfolding of the decision in that moment, and of course it is seamlessly matched by splicing together the constituents of our apparent physical body in its then current environment. How these manifestations are perceived across time by our and others' personal sensory networks are always unique. I sometimes think of it as exclusively boiling down to our location within the matrix - nothing more. Location, location, location. -
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Re: sue blackmore on free will (MP3)
Thu, July 31, 2008 - 2:31 AMwhy are signals that happen to be conscious unable to cause any effects? has our determinist monism spit up an epiphenomenon? i don;t care that conscious will is not the ultimate cause of behavior, but to render it totally causeless helps ourselves to the very dualism we are purportedly moving past. of course conscious decisions affect behavior! -
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Re: sue blackmore on free will (MP3)
Fri, August 1, 2008 - 1:55 AMThe term 'conscious' is a pretty loaded word.
The cause and the effect are one in the same, though cascade upon cascade of awareness is left far in the dust of our dualistic interpretations - that's what we do, and the far down the chain, out of our murkiness we piece together over time the sketch of our humanness. And who said anything is not causeless? Of course decisions affect behavior, it's just there's nobody making them.
The process of seeing is a mechanical process boring down to the quantum level and below, but lets not get down to the sheep farm. You can, within limits, analyze and respond to the cascading resonances and come up with whatever you are capable of, yet these capabilities are but the smoke of the burn, and though they can be mesmerizing, they are but downstream mechanizations that only appear warm and fuzzy.
Causation is not meaningless, just our interpretation of what *we think* that means.
Emotionally-driven snapshots unfold, entrenching themselves in the process, providing temporary anchors that melt over time, but the dust of which they're composed never settles.
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Re: sue blackmore on free will (MP3)
Fri, August 1, 2008 - 7:01 PMdoes the idea of self cause anything? i believe it does.
and i was responding to the interview in addition to your comments in my reference to epiphenomenalism and the rest. both sue and the interviewer repeatedly talked about how the mind or self has no ability to affect anything whatsoever. did i hear wrong? -
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Re: sue blackmore on free will (MP3)
Fri, August 1, 2008 - 10:39 PMI think you heard correctly. This slant makes sense if you consider what we define as the mind as in itself being the effect - or maybe better said - the effect in transition. Of course the mind is a conglomerate of highly integrated processes that are not synchronized even though we get a sense that they are. This illusion that the process is unified, this distortion of time that etches in us the impression that coherent processes proceed in unison can make think (quite convincingly) that there *is* an ability to affect, and this experiential dynamic can be most difficult to step back from - even for an instant. I'd say most never do. Most never even consider the idea or the possibility. -
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Re: sue blackmore on free will (MP3)
Fri, August 1, 2008 - 11:25 PMi think the solution is less special. i think it has to do with the way representations are experienced in the brain. once you have the capacity to represent, you also have the ability to meta-represent, and then you've lost direct contact to the phenomenal world as itself, unless you've come to accept the continuity of reality and the phenomenal nature of symbols themselves. the mind is like a fractal frond with curves within curves bending in on themselves and multiplying. the fact that grammar permits an infinite combination of strings makes real a more expansive vista than sensory information can. i think this juxtaposition, between an infinitely possible representational landscape and the finite corners of our sensory world, creates the concepts of "mind" and "body." each instance of representation is also itself, which is a constellation of neural firings, axon hillocks playing red rover red rover and holding the line or being burst through, dancing messengers swimming across synaptic moats to score.
i think neurath's boat is a great metaphor for cognition. i learned it from stanovich where he was talking specifically about a method for evaluating the memes in your brain: he drew the analogy from neurath, who once spoke of a boat that had a rotten plank that required repair without docking. so the rower had to leap from plank to plank, hoping it wasn't the fetid one, and fix those adjacent. stanovich concluded that we can't know objectively which memes are harmful and have to leap from one to the other to try to triangulate the position of a problem. i think maybe broadening this metaphor past memes to include precepts and imagined sensory experiences, you get a picture of what the mind is like, its powers, and its immense capacity for confusion and alienation. -
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Re: sue blackmore on free will (MP3)
Sun, August 3, 2008 - 1:14 PMIn a sense, all representation is meta-representation depending of course, on relativity. Granted, different circuitry is employed in what we call decision making, and is based upon familiarity, context, and variation in the circuitry itself... yet breaking it down from a more rarefied perspective, it's possible to characterize such events as deterministic wave interactions (at least if that happens to be your cup of tea). From here we can go upstream into the realms of particles, chemistry, biochemistry, anatomy and physiology, and then we can cross over into the world of representation and meta-representation and the mechanics of human perception as they are perceived and interpreted, and then we begin painting the picture of the mind and the self and the illusive 'I' that mysteriously dances its jig atop the intricacies, fading in and our most randomly. Maybe the 'self-narrative' you refer to is a type of reprocessing – excremental vapors bleeding from the machinations of the great machine, and then being reprocessed – a sort of mandated universal conservation-consciousness viewed from the perspective of us wigglies.
It would appear we dwell in two quite distinct worlds, one floating upon the turbulence of an infinitely complex sea, and another boring down to and beyond the depths of our capabilities of understanding as humans, to a world where 'to be or not to be' is a simple and effortless deterministic process. In the words of Chubby Checker, "How low can you go"?
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Re: sue blackmore on free will (MP3)
Fri, August 1, 2008 - 11:32 PM"This illusion that the process is unified, this distortion of time that etches in us the impression that coherent processes proceed in unison can make think (quite convincingly) that there *is* an ability to affect, and this experiential dynamic can be most difficult to step back from"
what i'm curious about is the experience of those who are no longer illusioned by it. if new positionings are possible among some people in this regard, than that's evidence that we don't have the essential necessary condition in mind yet. in other words, what is the function of the self narrative for those who have understanding of "anatta" or no-self? it still functions. it's like a priority list, a cliff notes version of the novel of my life, a way to manage the massive amount of information i am taking in -- the illusions have value. and in a sense are no longer illusions, since illusion requires a misinterpretation. i think this process is connected to the concept of "the gateless gate" in zen. it's not a gateless gatelessness. -
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Re: sue blackmore on free will (MP3)
Sun, August 3, 2008 - 1:38 PM"...the experience of those who are no longer illusioned by it..."
My first thought was that, "All men (and women) are NOT created equal". Whether one is illusioned or not-illusioned is a matter of degree and and has been predetermined for each individual related to a specific moment in space and time. As far as I can tell there is nobody alive or dead that is or was no longer illusioned. Belief in such a fantasy (no longer being illusioned) is perpetration of the 'great myth'. Of course, whether or not one believes is also predetermined. -
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Re: sue blackmore on free will (MP3)
Sun, August 3, 2008 - 6:48 PM"Belief in such a fantasy (no longer being illusioned) is perpetration of the 'great myth'"
you may be right, but i can't tell if you really understood that i was talking about the self illusion only. did you? -
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Re: sue blackmore on free will (MP3)
Sun, August 3, 2008 - 8:00 PM"did you?"
I thought I did, but you'll have to be the judge.
And then I had the thought, "Is it really possible for one person to really understand another; I mean really understand"? Hmmm.
Your words, "what i'm curious about is the experience of those who are no longer illusioned by it." And then you went on to referring to, "understanding of "anatta" or no-self?" and "the gateless gate".
The path my mind went down was that there is no such thing as "no longer illusioned". That the thought of that, even Sue's description of such, which was convincing to a certain degree, is true only to a certain point. As I see it there's no getting off the boat; there's no making our way through the "gateless gate". The flitting around of the infinite elements of the possibilities of awareness with respect to our presence and what that is for each of us is always cohered in a definitive matrix at any particular moment, even for the most advanced meditator or whom we might conceive of as the greatest of spiritual masters. Granted, conditions may allow one to more deeply focus, yet one world expands from one infinitude to the next, and there is no end to the depths, regardless of what we've read or been told. So, while it might be possible (for whatever reason) to bear down on the focus to the nth degree, one simply ends up with a more deeply magnified illusion of self, and I don't think there's really any going beyond this.
There is no such place as "experience of those who are no longer illusioned" and those who think that really down deep that they have reached such a place - well, they themselves in a certain sense have crystallized - at least with respect to certain possibilities. The gateless gate always remains open. -
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Re: sue blackmore on free will (MP3)
Sun, August 3, 2008 - 9:09 PMi may disagree. i think there is a kind of permanent conversion process where one no longer identifies with a "self" as a timeless and discrete essence. there is no endstate, i'm not saying that, but don't you think people move on to to different illusions sometimes? -
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Re: sue blackmore on free will (MP3)
Sun, August 3, 2008 - 9:36 PMWhere does the phenomenon of dissociation/ego-loss fit into this?
We can temporarily lose our phenomenal sense of self in practices like meditation and yoga, as well as drugs like salvia divinorum and the various hallucinogens. If you laugh you will feel like someone else is laughing. If you speak it will feel like someone else speaking who just happens to be borrowing your body. You feel like Hume's "bundle of perceptions."
But then the effect wears off and the sense of self returns. You still have a bundle of perceptoins, but now they feel like *your* perceptions. If Hume had access to some psylocybin mushrooms he would have been hit over the head by the fact that there is clearly some phenomenal first-person sense there that his bundle theory wasn't accounting for. The brain has circuits for representing agency and self vs. other. It's easy to miss this because under normal circumstances they are always on. When they turn off, things get weird. -
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Re: sue blackmore on free will (MP3)
Sun, August 3, 2008 - 11:24 PMi've had it happen (not on drugs either) for a 5 day period. it was strangely not weird....b/c there was no internal dialog concerned about it.
i dunno if the sense of self returns to everyone or not. how could i possibly speak for everyone? -
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Re: sue blackmore on free will (MP3)
Mon, August 4, 2008 - 12:58 AM"i dunno if the sense of self returns to everyone or not. how could i possibly speak for everyone?"
speak for..... your self!!! hehehe
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Re: sue blackmore on free will (MP3)
Mon, August 4, 2008 - 12:14 AMI think we're moving onto a different illusion every instant - no two instants ever alike. This isn't to say that one can't achieve plateaus that might personally be construed as a type of evolutionary transformation. Yet, to experience what we term as "a self", a type of presence, titillation of one's nervous system must take place. Likewise, to get a taste of no longer identifying with "a self" requires a presence of the experience, and generally such experiences are deeply engraved into our memories even though we might not be able to reactivate such experiences at will. Nevertheless, the imprints remain. I'm not denying hyperpresent states of awareness where the magnitude of such states overpower what we might term as our ordinary awareness, I'm saying I see these hyperextensions as variations in the human repertoire of experience. And it seems for me personally that the accumulation of these imprints are somehow woven together into a platform that will act as a type of base from where at some point in our futures we will be able to use them to spring to wherever that next level will be for each of us. -
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Re: sue blackmore on free will (MP3)
Mon, August 4, 2008 - 12:55 AMi am puzzled and want to reflect on this more. none of you seem to be describing the experience i'm referring to, which feels irreversible, like a mirror breaking. i'm going to need to chew on these comments for a while. i think we may be talking about why my eyes twinkle and i find myself defending the flame!
"I think we're moving onto a different illusion every instant - no two instants ever alike"
i'm just not sure i'm buying it every instant anymore. i think it's the buying it i'm referring to here.
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Re: sue blackmore on free will (MP3)
Mon, August 4, 2008 - 12:29 PMIn what sense is the term "illusion" being used here. Could someone define it and give an example, as well as an example of non-illusion if possible? -
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Re: sue blackmore on free will (MP3)
Mon, August 4, 2008 - 3:47 PMI was bouncing off blue's "don't you think people move on to to different illusions sometimes?"
But I guess in a sense you could consider everything as being an illusion - depends where you're coming from. Though, I'd say there are varying degrees. There's a more-or-less commonly accepted mode of acceptance for every day communication, and even though there's always some degree of variation, people in general are pretty flexible in accepting others' perspectives. When communication veers from the generally accepted norm (which also contextually varies), then one (or both) parties might be experiencing illusion(s), or could be considered as being deluded. People's tolerances to what they feel as the deluded states of others varies a lot, and is affected by what they consider as being normal, context of the situation, and one's emotional state.
Likewise 'non-illusion' falls under same rules of nebulousness.
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Re: sue blackmore on free will (MP3)
Mon, August 4, 2008 - 4:47 PMan illusion is a persistent misinterpretation on a very rudimentary level. oops, gotta go, but that's my quick stab. -
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Re: sue blackmore on free will (MP3)
Mon, August 4, 2008 - 6:11 PMillusion is distorted perception.
perhaps the best it gets is low distortion.
I'll take that, along with some rather interesting and wonderful distortions.
like the eye doctor said, "Is this clearer, or this?
A distortion is the alteration of the original form of information or representation.
At least in some cases, distortion could be a vast improvement.
some alteration is growth, transformation, decay and concealment. -
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Re: sue blackmore on free will (MP3)
Mon, August 4, 2008 - 9:24 PMA question remains with respect to interaction between people... How do you know if the input from someone else is distorted or if your perception and understanding of that input is out of whack? -
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Re: sue blackmore on free will (MP3)
Mon, August 4, 2008 - 9:46 PM" How do you know if the input from someone else is distorted or if your perception and understanding of that input is out of whack?"
telepathy via sound waves projected from your face opening is the recommended method!!! LOL -
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Re: sue blackmore on free will (MP3)
Mon, August 4, 2008 - 10:14 PMYeah, ya gotta watch out for the Om hole ;-)
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Re: sue blackmore on free will (MP3)
Sat, August 2, 2008 - 9:27 PMwould you accept the proposition that all known effects are also causes? -
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Re: sue blackmore on free will (MP3)
Sun, August 3, 2008 - 1:45 PMConceptualizing the phrase 'all known effects' is a bit much for me to wrap my mind around. Can you rephrase this? Or restate the question? -
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Re: sue blackmore on free will (MP3)
Sun, August 3, 2008 - 6:48 PMdo we know of anything that doesn't cause something else?
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Re: sue blackmore on free will (MP3)
Fri, August 1, 2008 - 7:07 PM"Of course decisions affect behavior, it's just there's nobody making them. "
everything is an event; there are no objects. everything is dynamic, interdependent, and multi-dimensional. all of this applies to self as well as everything else. but when we talk about causation, we don't go all the way back and use, for example, the "big bang defense" in court. we talk about proximate causes. people do things. they think of things they want to do, and then they do them. the motivational thought had its own causes of course. we are looking at regulatory loops with multiple feedback processes and complicated inputs, and not some mini-big bang in the brain.
i don't want to invent an immaterial entity known as the self or the mind that is somehow completely ineffectual in this process. it's not the case. these are just a part of a larger dance, but they do effect things. even if you accept that the notion of self is illusory, you can see the effects of this illusion readily. these things matter because they are instantiated materially just as much as anything. what gets confusing is the ontic status of the private precept or representation, and we have ideas on how to approach both.
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Re: sue blackmore on free will (MP3)
Thu, July 31, 2008 - 2:33 AM"n theory, at least, there is really nobody there to fine-tune them."
so, do you doubt seeing as well, since there is no self to see?
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Re: sue blackmore on free will (MP3)
Thu, July 31, 2008 - 2:34 AM"A person doesn't lie, as much as a person is a vehicle through which the apparent action of a lie might be construed as such after the fact."
if everything is simply a vehicle, then we have rendered causation meaningless.
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