The Silent Engines Of Revolution

topic posted Sat, January 31, 2009 - 8:49 AM by  Auton
Share/Save/Bookmark
Advertisement

What Cooked the World's Economy?

Tuesday 27 January 2009

»

by: James Lieber, The Village Voice


It wasn't your overdue mortgage.

It's 2009. You're laid off, furloughed, foreclosed on, or you know someone who is. You wonder where you'll fit into the grim new semi-socialistic post-post-industrial economy colloquially known as "this mess."

You're astonished and possibly ashamed that mutant financial instruments dreamed up in your great country have spawned worldwide misery. You can't comprehend, much less trim, the amount of bailout money parachuting into the laps of incompetents, hoarders, and miscreants. It's been a tough century so far: 9/11, Iraq, and now this. At least we have a bright new president. He'll give you a job painting a bridge. You may need it to keep body and soul together.

The basic story line so far is that we are all to blame, including homeowners who bit off more than they could chew, lenders who wrote absurd adjustable-rate mortgages, and greedy investment bankers.

Credit derivatives also figure heavily in the plot. Apologists say that these became so complicated that even Wall Street couldn't understand them and that they created "an unacceptable level of risk." Then these blowhards tell us that the bailout will pump hundreds of billions of dollars into the credit arteries and save the patient, which is the world's financial system. It will take time - maybe a year or so - but if everyone hangs in there, we'll be all right. No structural damage has been done, and all's well that ends well.

Sorry, but that's drivel. In fact, what we are living through is the worst financial scandal in history. It dwarfs 1929, Ponzi's scheme, Teapot Dome, the South Sea Bubble, tulip bulbs, you name it. Bernie Madoff? He's peanuts.

Credit derivatives - those securities that few have ever seen - are one reason why this crisis is so different from 1929.

Derivatives weren't initially evil. They began as insurance policies on large loans. A bank that wished to lend money to a big, but shaky, venture, like what Ford or GM have become, could hedge its bet by buying a credit derivative to cover losses if the debtor defaulted. Derivatives weren't cheap, but in the era of globalization and declining American competitiveness, they were prudent. Interestingly, the company that put the basic hardware and software together for pricing and clearing derivatives was Bloomberg. It was quite expensive for a financial institution - say, a bank - to get a Bloomberg machine and receive the specialized training required to certify analysts who would figure out the terms of the insurance. These Bloomberg terminals, originally called Market Masters, were first installed at Merrill Lynch in the late 1980s.

Subsequently, thousands of units have been placed in trading and financial institutions; they became the cornerstone of Michael Bloomberg's wealth, marrying his skills as a securities trader and an electrical engineer.

It's an open question when or if he or his company knew how they would be misused over time to devastate the world's economy.

:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

Fast-forward to the early years of the Clinton administration. After an initial surge of regulatory behavior in favor of fair markets, especially in antitrust, that sort of behavior was abandoned, and free markets triumphed. The result was a morass of white-collar sociopathy at Archer Daniels Midland, Enron, and WorldCom, and in a host of markets ranging from oil to vitamins.

This was the beginning of the heyday of hedge funds. Unregulated investment houses were originally based on the questionable but legal practice of short-selling - selling a financial instrument you don't own in hopes of buying it back later at a lower price. That way, you hedge your bets: You cover your investment in a company in case a company's stock price falls.

But hedge funds later diversified their practices beyond that easy definition. These funds acquired a good deal of popular mystique. They made scads of money. Their notoriously high entry fees - up to 5 percent of the investment, plus as much as 36 percent of profits - served as barriers to all but the richest investors, who gave fortunes to the funds to play with. The funds boasted of having genius analysts and fabulous proprietary algorithms. Few could discern what they really did, but the returns, for those who could buy in, often seemed magical.

But it wasn't magic. It amounted to the return of the age-old scam called "bucket shops." Also sometimes known as "boiler rooms," bucket shops emerged after the Civil War. Usually, they were storefronts where people came to bet on stocks without owning them. Unlike their customers, the shops actually owned blocks of stock. If customers were betting that a stock would go up, the shops would sell it and the price would plunge; if bettors were bearish, the shops would buy. In this way, they cleaned out their customers. Frenetic bucket-shop activity caused the Panic of 1907. By 1909, New York had banned bucket shops, and every other state soon followed.

In the mid-'90s, though, the credit-derivatives industry was hitting its stride and argued vehemently for exclusion from all state and federal anti-bucket-shop regulations. On the side of the industry were Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, and his deputy, Lawrence Summers. Holding the fort for the regulators was Brooksley Born, who headed the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). The three financial titans ridiculed the virtually unknown and cloutless, but brilliant and prophetic Born, who warned that unrestricted derivatives trading would "threaten our regulated markets, or indeed, our economy, without any federal agency knowing about it." Warren Buffett also weighed in against deregulation.

But Congress loved Greenspan - a/k/a "the Maestro" and "the Oracle" - and Clinton loved Rubin. The sleepy hearings received almost no public attention. The upshot was that Congress removed oversight of derivatives from the CFTC and preempted all state anti-bucket-shop laws. Born resigned shortly afterward.

Soon, something odd started to happen. Legitimate big investors, often with millions of dollars to place, found that they couldn't get into certain hedge funds, despite the fact that they were willing to pay steep fees. In retrospect, it seems as if these funds did not want fussy outsiders looking into what they were doing with derivatives.

:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

Imagine that a person is terminally ill. He or she would not be able to buy a life insurance policy with a huge death benefit. Obviously, third parties could not purchase policies on the soon-to-be-dead person's life. Yet something like that occurred in the financial world.

This was not caused by imprudent mortgage lending, though that was a piece of the puzzle. Yes, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were put on steroids during the '90s, and some people got into mortgages who shouldn't have. But the vast majority of homeowners paid their mortgages. Only about 5 to 10 percent of these loans failed - not enough to cause systemic financial failure. (The dollar amount of defaulted mortgages in the U.S. is about $1.2 trillion, which seems like a princely sum, but it's not nearly enough to drag down the entire civilized world.)

Much more dangerous was the notorious bundling of mortgages. Investment banks gathered these loans into batches and turned them into securities called collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). Many included high-risk loans. These securities were then rated by Standard & Poor's, Fitch Ratings, or Moody's Investors Services, who were paid at premium rates and gave investment grades. This was like putting lipstick on pigs with the plague. Banks like Wachovia, National City, Washington Mutual, and Lehman Brothers loaded up on this financial trash, which soon proved to be practically worthless. Today, those banks are extinct. But even that was not enough to cause a worldwide financial crisis.

What did cause the crisis was the writing of credit derivatives. In theory, they were insurance policies for investors; in practice, they became a guarantee of global financial collapse.

As insurance, they were poised to pay off fabulously when these weak bundled securities failed. And who was waiting to collect? Well, every gambler is looking for a sure bet. Most never find it. But the hedge funds and their ilk did.

:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

The mantra of entrepreneurial culture is that high risk goes with high reward. But unregulated and opaque derivatives trading was countercultural in the sense that low or no risk led to quick, astronomically high rewards. By plunking down millions of dollars, a hedge fund could reap billions once these fatally constructed securities plunged. Again, the funds did not need to own the securities; they just needed to pay for the derivatives - the insurance policies for the securities. And they could pay for them again and again. This was known as replicating. It became an addiction.

About $2 trillion in credit derivatives in 1989 jumped to $8 trillion in 1994 and skyrocketed to $100 trillion in 2002. Last year, the Bank for International Settlements, a consortium of the world's central banks based in Basel (the Fed chair, Ben Bernanke, sits on its board), reported the gross value of these commitments at $596 trillion. Some are due, and some will mature soon. Typically, they involve contracts of five years or less.

Credit derivatives are breaking and will continue to break the world's financial system and cause an unending crisis of liquidity and gummed-up credit. Warren Buffett branded derivatives the "financial weapons of mass destruction." Felix Rohatyn, the investment banker who organized the bailout of New York a generation ago, called them "financial hydrogen bombs."

Both are right. At almost $600 trillion, over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives dwarf the value of publicly traded equities on world exchanges, which totaled $62.5 trillion in the fall of 2007 and fell to $36.6 trillion a year later.

The nice thing about public markets is that they act as canaries that give warnings as they did in 1929, 1987 (the program trading debacle), and 2001 (the dot-com bubble), so we can scramble out with our economic lives. But completely private and unregulated, the OTC derivatives trade is justly known as the "dark market."

:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

The heart of darkness was the AIG Financial Products (AIGFP) office in London, where a large proportion of the derivatives were written. AIG had placed this unit outside American borders, which meant that it would not have to abide by American insurance reserve requirements. In other words, the derivatives clerks in London could sell as many products as they could write - even if it would bankrupt the company.

The president of AIGFP, a tyrannical super-salesman named Joseph Cassano, certainly had the experience. In the 1980s, he was an executive at Drexel Burnham Lambert, the now-defunct brokerage that became the pivot of the junk-bond scandal that led to the jailing of Michael Milken, David Levine, and Ivan Boesky.

During the peak years of derivatives trading, the 400 or so employees of the London unit reportedly averaged earnings in excess of a million dollars a year. They sold "protection" - this Runyonesque term was favored - worth more than three times the value of parent company AIG. How could they have not known that they were putting at risk the largest insurer in the world and all the businesses and individuals that it covered?

This scheme that smacks of securities fraud facilitated the dreams of buyers called "counterparties" willing to ante up. Hedge fund offices sprouted in Kensington and Mayfair like mushrooms after a summer shower. Revenue from premiums for derivatives at AIGFP rose from $737 million in 1999 to $3.26 billion in 2005. Cassano reportedly hectored ever-willing counterparties to "play the power game" - in other words, gobble up all the credit derivatives backing CDOs that they could grab. As the bundled adjustable-rate mortgages ballooned, stretched home buyers defaulted, and the exciting power game became about as risky as blasting sitting ducks with a Glock.

People still seem surprised to read that hedge principals have raked in billions of dollars in a single year. They shouldn't be. These subprime-time players knew how to score. The scam bled AIG white. In mid-September, when it was on the ropes, AIG received an astonishing $85 billion emergency line of credit from the Fed. Soon, that was supplemented by another $67 billion. Much of that money, to use the government's euphemism, has already been "drawn down." Shamefully, neither Washington nor AIG will explain where the billions went. But the answer is increasingly clear: It went to counterparties who bought derivatives from Cassano's shop in London.

:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

Imagine if a ring of cashiers at a local bank made thousands of bad loans, aware that they could break the bank. They would be prosecuted for fraud and racketeering under the anti-gangster RICO Act. If their counterparties - the debtors - were in on the scam and understood that they didn't have to pay off the loans, they could be charged, too. In fact, this scenario played out at subprime-pushing outlets of a host of banks, including Washington Mutual (acquired last year by JP Morgan Chase, which itself received a $25 billion bailout); IndyMac (which was seized by FDIC regulators); and Lehman Brothers (which went belly-up). About 150 prosecutions of this type of fraud are going forward.

The top of the swamp's food chain, where the muck was derivatives rather than mortgages, must also be scrutinized. Apparently, that is the case. AIGFP's Cassano has hired top white-collar litigator and former prosecutor F. Joseph Warin (profiled in the 2004 Washingtonian piece, "Who to Call When You're Under Investigation!"). Neither Cassano nor his attorney responded to interview requests.

AIG's lavishly compensated counterparties were willing participants and likewise could be considered for prosecution, depending on what they knew. Who were they?

At a 2007 conference, Cassano defined them as a "global swath" that included "banks and investment banks, pension funds, endowments, foundations, insurance companies, hedge funds, money managers, high-net-worth individuals, municipalities, sovereigns, and supranationals." Abetting the scheme, ratings agencies like Standard & Poor's gave high grades to the shaky mortgage-backed securities bundled by investment banks such as Goldman Sachs and Lehman Brothers.

After the relative worthlessness of these CDOs became clear, the raters rushed to downgrade them to junk status. This occurred suddenly with more than 4,000 CDOs in the first quarter of 2008 - the financial community now regards them as "toxic waste." Of course, the sudden massive downgrading raises the question: Why had CDOs been artificially elevated in the first place, leading banks to buy them and giving them protective coloring just because the derivatives writers "insured" them?

After the raters got real (i.e., got scared), the gig was up. Hedge funds fled in droves from their luxe digs in London. The industry remains murky, but some observers feel that more than half of all hedges will fold this year. Not necessarily a good sign, it seems to show that the funds were one-trick ponies living mainly off the derivatives play.

We know that AIG was not the only firm that sold derivatives: Lehman and Bear Stearns both dealt them and died. About 20 years ago, JP Morgan, the now-defunct investment bank, had brought the idea to AIGFP in London, which ran with it. Seeing the Cassano group's success, Morgan jumped in with both feet. Specializing in credit default swaps - a type of derivative triggered to pay off by negative events in the lives of loans, like defaults, foreclosures, and restructurings - Morgan had a distinctive marketing spin. Its "quants" were classy young dealers who could really do the math, which of course gave them credibility with those who couldn't. They abjured street slang like "protection." They pitched their sophisticated swaps as "technologies." The market adored them. They, in turn, oversold the product, made huge commissions, and wounded Morgan, which had to sell itself to Chase, becoming JP Morgan Chase - now the country's biggest bank.

Today, the real question is whether the Morgan quants knew the swaps didn't work and actually were grenades with pulled pins. Like Joseph Cassano, such people should consult attorneys.

:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

Secrecy shrouds the bailout. The 21 banks that each received more than $1 billion from the Fed won't disclose how, or even if, they're lending it, which hardly quells fears of hoarding. The Treasury says it can't force disclosure because it took only preferred (non-voting) stock in exchange for the money.

If anything, the Fed had been less candid. It stonewalls requests to reveal the winners (mainly banks and corporations) of $1.5 trillion in loans, as well as the securities it received as collateral. A Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) suit to obtain this information by Bloomberg News has been rebuffed by the Fed, which insists that a loophole in FOIA exempts it. Bloomberg will probably lose the case, but at least it's trying to probe the black hole of bailout money. Of course, Barack Obama could tell the Fed to release the information, plus generally open the bailout to public eyes. That would be change that we could believe in.

As for Bloomberg, its business side, Bloomberg L.P., has been less than forthcoming. Requests to interview someone from the company - and Michael Bloomberg, who retains a controlling interest - about the derivatives trade went unanswered.

In his economic address at Cooper Union last spring, Obama argued for new regulations, which he called "the rules of the road," and for a $30 billion stimulus package, that now seems quaint. In the OTC swaps trade, the Bloomberg L.P.'s computer terminals are the road, bridges, and tunnels for "real-time" transactions. The L.P.'s promotional materials declare: "You're either in front of a Bloomberg or behind it." In terms of electronic trading of certain securities, including credit default swaps: "Access to a dealer's inventory is based upon client relationships with Bloomberg as the only conduit." In short, the L.P. looks like a dominant player - possibly, a monopoly. If it has a true competitor, I can't find it. But then, this is a very dark market.

Did Bloomberg L.P. do anything illegal? Absolutely not. We prosecute hit-and-run drivers, not roads. But there are many questions - about the size of the derivatives market, the names of the counterparties, the amount of replication of derivatives, the role of securities ratings in Bloomberg calculations (in other words, could puffing up be detected and potentially stop a swap?), and how the OTC industry should be reported and regulated in order to prevent future catastrophes. Bloomberg is a privately held company - to the chagrin of would-be investors - and quite private about its business, so this information probably won't surface without subpoenas.

:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

So what do we do now? In 2000, the 106th Congress as its final effort passed the Commodity Futures Modernization Act (CFMA), and, disgracefully, President Clinton signed it. It opened up the bucket-shop loophole that capsized the world's economic system. With the stroke of a presidential pen, a century of valuable protection was lost.

Even with that, the dangerous swaps still almost found themselves subjected to state oversight. In 2000, AIG asked the New York State Insurance Department to decide if it wanted to regulate them, but the department's superintendent, Neil Levin, said no. The question was not posed by AIGFP, but by the company's main office through its general counsel, a reminder that not long ago, AIG was a blue chip with a triple-A rating that touted its integrity.

We can't know why Levin rejected the chance to regulate the tricky trade. He died in the restaurant at the top of the World Trade Center on the morning of 9/11. A Pataki-appointed former Goldman Sachs vice president, Levin may have shared other Wall Streeters' love of derivatives as the last big-money sure thing as the IPO craze wound down. Or maybe he saw swaps as gambling rather than insurance, hence beyond his jurisdiction. Regardless, current Insurance Superintendent Eric Dinallo told me, "I don't agree with his answer." Maybe the economic crisis could have been averted if Levin had answered otherwise. "How close we came ..." Dinallo mused.

Deeply occupied with keeping AIG, the parent company, afloat since the bailout, Dinallo saw the carnage that the swaps caused and, with the support of Governor Paterson, pushed anew for regulatory oversight, a position also adopted by the President's Working Group (PWG), which includes the Treasury, Fed, SEC, and CFTC.

But regulation isn't enough to stop a phenomenon called "de-supervision" that occurs when officials can't, or won't, oversee a market. For instance, the Fed under Greenspan had authority to regulate mortgage bankers and brokers, the industry's cowboys who kicked off this fiasco. Because Greenspan's libertarian sensibilities prevented him from invoking the Fed's control, the mortgage market careened corruptly until the wheels came off. Notoriously lax and understaffed, the SEC did nothing to limit investment banks that bundled, pitched, and puffed non-prime mortgages as the raters cheered. It's doubtful that any agency can be relied on to control lucrative default swaps, which should be made illegal again. The bucket-shop loophole must be closed. The evil genie should go back in the bottle.

Will Obama re-criminalize these financial weapons by pushing for repeal of the CFMA? This should be a no-brainer for Obama, who, before becoming a community organizer in Chicago, worked on Wall Street, studied derivatives, and by now undoubtedly knows their destructive power.

What about the $600 trillion in credit derivatives that are still out there, sucking vital liquidity and credit out of the system? It's the tyrannosaurus in the mall, the one that made Henry Paulson, the former Treasury Secretary who looks like Daddy Warbucks, get down on his knees and beg Nancy Pelosi for a bailout.

Even with the bailout, no one can get their arms around this monster. Obviously, the $600 trillion includes not only many unseemly replicated death bets, but also some benign derivatives that creditors bought to hedge risky loans. Instead of sorting them out, the Bush administration tried to protect them all, while keeping the counterparties happy and anonymous.

Paulson has taken flack for spending little to bring mortgages in line with falling home values. Sheila Bair, the FDIC chief who often scrapped with Paulson, said this would cost a measly $25 billion and that without it, 10 million Americans could lose their homes over the next five years. Paulson thought it would take three times as much and balked. Congress is bristling because the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) could provide mortgage relief - and some derivatives won't detonate if homeowners don't default. Obama's nominee for Treasury Secretary, Timothy Geithner, could back such relief at his hearings.

The other key appointment is attorney general. A century ago, when powerful trusts distorted the market system, we had AGs who relentlessly tracked and busted them. Today's crisis is missing, so far, an advocate as dynamic and energetic as the mortgage bankers, brokers, bundlers, raters, and quants who, in a few short years, littered the world with rotten loans, diseased CDOs, and lethal derivatives. During the Bush years, white-collar law enforcement actually dropped as FBI agents were transferred to antiterrorism. Even so, according to William Black, an effective federal litigator and regulator during the 1980s savings-and-loan scandal, by 2004, the FBI perceived an epidemic of fraud. Now a professor of law and finance at the University of Missouri-Kansas City, Black has testified to Congress about the current crisis and paints it as "control fraud" at every level. Such fraud flows from the top tiers of corporations - typically CEOs and CFOs, who control perverse compensation systems that reward cheating and volume rather than quality, and circumvent standard due diligence such as underwriting and accounting. For instance, AIGFP's Cassano reportedly rebuffed AIG's internal auditor.

The environment from the top of the chain - derivatives gang leaders - to the bottom of the chain - subprime, no-doc loan officers - became "criminogenic," Black says. The only real response? Aggressive prosecution of "elites" at all stages in this twisted mess. Black says sentences should not be the light, six-month slaps that white-collar criminals usually get, or the Madoff-style penthouse arrest.

As staggering as the Madoff meltdown was, it had a refreshing side - the funds were frozen. In the bailout, on the other hand, the government often seems to be completing the scam by quietly passing the proceeds to counterparties.

The advantage of treating these players like racketeers under federal law is that their ill-gotten gains could be forfeited. The government could recoup these odious gambling debts instead of simply paying them off. In finance, the bottom line is the bottom line. The bottom line in this scandal is that fantastically wealthy entities positioned themselves to make unfathomable fortunes by betting that average Americans - Joe Six-Packs and hockey moms - would fail.

Black suggests that derivatives should be "unwound" and that the payouts cease: "Close out the positions - most of them have no social utility." And where there has been fraud, he adds, "clawback makes perfect sense." That would include taking back the ludicrously large bonuses and other forms of compensation given to CEOs at bailed-out companies.

No one knows how much could be clawed back from the soiled derivatives reap. Clearly, it's not $600 trillion. William Bergman, formerly a market analyst at the Chicago Fed in "netting" - what's left after financial institutions pay each other off for ongoing deals and debts - makes a "guess" that perhaps only 5 percent could be recouped, which he concedes is unfortunately low. Still, that's $30 trillion, a huge number, more than 10 times what the Fed can deploy and over twice the U.S. gross domestic product. Such a sum, if recovered through the criminal justice process, could ease the liquidity crisis and actually get the credit arteries flowing. Not everyone would like it. What's left of Wall Street and hedge funds want their derivatives gains; so do foreign banks.

:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

A tangle of secrecy, conflicts of interest, and favoritism plagues the process of recovery.

Lehman drowned, but Goldman Sachs, where Paulson was formerly CEO, was saved. The day before AIG reaped its initial $85 billion bonanza, Paulson met with his successor, Lloyd Blankfein, who reportedly argued that Goldman would lose $20 billion and fail unless AIG was rescued. AIG got the money.

Had Goldman bought from AIG credit derivatives that it needed to redeem? Like most other huge financial traders, Goldman has a secretive hedge fund, Global Alpha, that refuses to reveal its transactions. Regardless, Paulson's meeting with Blankfein was a low point. If Dick Cheney had met with his successor at Halliburton and, the very next day, written a check for billions that guaranteed its survival, the press would have screamed for his head.

The second most shifty bailout went to Citigroup, a money sewer that won last year's layoff super bowl with 73,000. Instead of being parceled to efficient operators, Citi received a $45 billion bailout and $300 billion loan package, at least in part because of Robert Rubin's juice. While Treasury Secretary under Clinton, Rubin led us into the derivatives maelstrom, deported jobs with NAFTA, and championed bank deregulation so that companies like Citi could mimic Wall Street speculators. After he joined Citi's leadership in 1999, the bank went long on mortgages and other risks du jour, enmeshed itself in Enron's web, tanked in value, and suffered haphazard management, while Rubin made more than $100 million.

Rubin remained a director and "senior counselor" at Citi until January 9, 2009, and is an economic adviser to Obama. In truth, he probably shouldn't be a senior counselor anywhere except possibly at Camp Granada. Like Greenspan, he should retire before he breaks something again, and we have to pay for it. (Incidentally, the British bailout, which is more open than ours and mandates mortgage relief, makes corporate welfare contingent on the removal of bad management.)

The third strangest rescue involved the Fed's announcement just before Christmas that hedge funds for the first time could borrow from it. Apparently, the new $200 billion credit line relates to recently revealed securitized debts including bundled credit card bills, student loans, and auto loans. Obviously, it's worrisome that the crisis may be morphing beyond its real estate roots.

:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

To say the bailout hasn't worked so far is putting it mildly. Since the crisis broke, Washington's reaction has been chaotic, lenient to favorites, secretive, and staggeringly expensive. An estimated $7.36 trillion, more than double the total American outlay for World War II (even correcting for inflation), has been thrown at the problem, according to press reports. Along the way, banking, insurance, and car companies have been nationalized, and no one has been brought to justice.

Combined unemployment and underemployment (those who have stopped looking, and part-timers) runs at nearly 20 percent, the highest since 1945. Housing prices continue to hemorrhage - last fall's 18 percent drop could double. Holiday shopping fizzled: 160,000 stores closed last year, and 200,000 more are expected to shutter in '09. Some forecasts place eventual retail darkness at 25 percent. In 2008, the Dow dropped further - 34 percent - than at any time since 1931. There is no sound sector in the economy; the only members of the 30 Dow Jones Industrials posting gains last year were Wal-Mart and McDonald's.

Does Obama's choice for attorney general, Eric Holder, have the tenacity and will to tackle the widest fraud in American history? Parts of his background don't necessarily augur well: He worked on a pardon for Marc Rich, the fugitive billionaire tax evader once on the FBI's Most Wanted List whom Clinton cleared. After leaving the Clinton era's Justice Department, Holder went to work for Covington & Burling, a D.C. firm that represents corporate heavies including Big Tobacco. He defended Chiquita Brands in a notorious case, in which it paid a $25 million fine for using terrorists in Columbia as security. Holder fits well within the gaggle of elite D.C. lawyers who move back and forth between government and defending corporate criminals. He doesn't exactly have the sort of résumé that startles robber barons.

Can Holder design and orchestrate a muscular legal response, including prosecution and stern punishment of top executives, plus aggressive clawbacks of money? There seems little question that he has the skill, so the decision on how aggressive the Justice Department will be is up to Obama.

Holder could ask for and get well-organized FBI white-collar teams. The personnel hole caused by shifts to antiterrorism would have to be more than filled to their pre-9/ll staffing if the incoming administration decides to break this criminogenic cycle rather than merely address it symbolically.

Black contends that aggressive prosecution would be good for the economy because it may help prevent cheating and fraud that inevitably cause bubbles and destroy wealth. The Sarbanes-Oxley law passed in Enron's wake, for instance, is supposed to make corporations now keep the kinds of documents necessary to assess criminality. Whether the CEOs, CFOs, and others who controlled the current frauds will do so is another matter.

"Don't count on them keeping records for long," Black warns. "It's time to get out the subpoenas."

-------

James Lieber is a lawyer whose books on business and politics include "Friendly Takeover" (Penguin) and "Rats in the Grain" (Basic Books). This is his fifth article for The Voice.


www.truthout.org/013009T
posted by:
Auton
Vancouver
Advertisement
Advertisement
  • Re: The Silent Engines Of Revolution

    Sun, February 1, 2009 - 11:36 AM
    Banker + gangster = bankster


    It seems timely to resurrect this Americanism from the 1930s - one of many evocative words the United States has contributed to the English language, says Harold Evans.

    Americans are pretty good at adding words to the English language. We owe them pin-up girls, highbrows, killjoys, stooges, hobos, drop-outs, shills, bobby-soxers, hijackers, do-gooders and hitchhikers who thumb a ride.


    The Americanisms are so much more concise and vivid. Instead of saying "sorry we're late but drivers ahead of us slowed us down when they craned their necks to look at a crash" you can say "we were held up by rubberneckers".

    Words pop in and out of our language as social conditions change. The American gangster, which is still with us, has been around as a noun and a reality since 1896 according to my Shorter Oxford, but it seems to have dropped another Americanism from the 1930s and I think now is the time to revive it.

    The word is bankster, derived by a marriage of banker and gangster.
    Crowds gathered in Wall St as news of the 1929 crash spread
    Stunned crowds gathered on Wall St as news of the 1929 crash spread

    It was coined, as far as I can deduce, by an American immigrant, a fiery Sicilian-born lawyer by the name of Ferdinand Pecora. He was the chief counsel to the US Senate Committee on Banking set up in the early 30s to probe the origins of the Crash of 1929.

    He exposed quite a lot of the Wall Street practices that Harvard's Professor William Z Ripley had condemned in 1928. The believable Ripley called them - get ready for these Americanisms - "prestidigitation, double-shuffling, honey-fugling, hornswoggling and skullduggery".

    The professor had vainly tried to warn President Calvin Coolidge that Wall Street was full of gas and was bound to blow up. To great discomfort all round, Pecora identified Coolidge himself, by then out of office, as one of those who'd been in on the honey-fugling.

    The great banking house of JP Morgan had the president on a "preferred list" by which the bank's influential friends were given a chance to buy stock at half price. Shall we say, they made out like bandits?

    Today the term bankster perfectly fits Bernard Madoff, whose crooked Ponzi scheme lost $50 billion of what the trade calls OPM - other people's money - invested with him.

    Costly rug

    But the revelations come thick and fast. People are now struggling for words to describe the latest example of Wall St's money madness. The fabled investment bank Merrill Lynch, run by one John Thain, had so many big zeroes on its balance sheet it would have been liquidated in December but for a merger with the Bank of America.



    That was actually a shotgun marriage - in the US vernacular - since the Bank of America was forced to take billions of government money when it learned later that Merrill Lynch was down another $15bn.

    Then what? In the few days in December while he was still in charge, Mr Thain reportedly spent nearly $4bn on staff bonuses. That's peanuts on Wall St. In 2007 Mr Thain himself received $83m.

    But a week ago, CNBC's Charles Gasparino, in a detailed scoop on the Daily Beast website revealed that during the time Mr Thain was busy cost-cutting, he spent $1.1m doing up his office - $86,000 for a rug, $35,000 for something called a commode on legs.

    Readers bayed for blood, posting comments such as: "Oh how I wish this was Revolutionary France and we peasants could storm the offices…"

    The anger about the greed that got us into our mess is, in my view, wholly justified. And now we hear that 10 of the big banks that got $148bn from Uncle Sam so they could make loans to get things humming again have actually reduced their loan totals by $46bn.

    Mr Thain now is history, having resigned, but the great Bank of America, the biggest in the US and maybe the world is now on the list of banks that may have to be nationalised - a word no red-blooded American ever thought would be uttered in the land of enterprise.

    Have money, will lend

    The piquancy of all this is that if the term banker is ever to be restored to its former prestige, the public and Wall St might reflect on one highly relevant example of a banker who was not a bankster.


    It is the story of Amadeo Peter Giannini, a big man on the side of the little man. When the transcontinental railway started services to California after the line's completion in May 1869, he was among the very first passengers.

    He was in the womb of his newlywed mother, 15-year-old Virginia. His father, having made money in the goldfields, had gone back to Italy for her. It is nice to think that as the young immigrants crossed the Rockies, their adventurous spirits somehow crossed the placental barrier.

    Amadeo was born on 6 May, 1870. He grew up on a little farm, whose produce his mother and father sold in booming San Francisco. In 1877 when he was six, he saw his father gunned down. His mother moved to the city to buy wholesale from farmers and sell to shops.

    Amadeo - or AP as he became known - grew into a tall, strong man, more than able to hold his own in the rough auctions for fruit and veg on the wharfs where traders met the farmers' boats. He helped to build a thriving business.

    When he was 31 he sold his share, saying he had no interest in accumulating wealth. "No man owns a fortune," he said. "It owns him." It was the motto of his life.



    He'd married and on the death of his father in law, was persuaded to take his vacant place on the board of a little bank in North Beach. He was appalled that they'd not lend money to poor immigrants. The rows in the board room reverberated over North Beach until AP walked out and started a little bank of his own to do that, the Bank of Italy.

    From his work on the wharves, he'd become a shrewd judge of character, so he'd cheerfully lend money to pay doctor's bills for delivery of a baby if he judged the couple had integrity.

    Phoenix from the rubble

    On Wednesday 18 April, 1906, San Francisco was devastated by earthquake and fire. AP rushed to get all his gold and paper money out of danger, hid it under orange crates to conceal it from looters, and stood guard all night in his home.

    It must have been a debilitating moment the next day to find his baby bank a mass of charred rubble. The bigger banks, who had vaults too hot to open, had no records and were not lending.
    People watch smoke billowing over a collapsed SF, 1906
    Smoke billows from San Francisco's flattened buildings

    AP instead went down to a wharf close to the smouldering North Beach, flung a plank across two barrels, and with his baritone booming across the desolation, started lending some of his $80,000 to rebuild San Francisco.

    He looked for steamship captains he knew, shoved money into their hands, saying "go north and get lumber". AP radiated so much confidence, making a big show of jiggling his little bag of gold, hundreds who'd been hoarding cash and gold banked it with him. North Beach was built faster than any other area.

    By 1918 he'd established California's first state-wide banking system. A little local bank in the valley that would have closed in a run after a bad harvest could now keep open by borrowing from the city branch.

    He set out to build a nationwide banking system so that distressed areas could be helped by ones that were prospering. Wall St hated him. He beat off their attempts to destroy him. In the Great Depression, he took every opportunity in the New Deal legislation to get California revived in time for the war and the boom that followed.

    He did it by putting the community first, himself last. He set up low interest instalment credit plans which enabled thousands to avoid the loan sharks and buy cookers and refrigerators and autos, and he built a whole new electrical industry with his loans.

    He financed the Golden Gate bridge, and the Disney movie Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs.

    No man could do so much good without being maligned. It was said he wore the mask of populism to create a dangerous instrument of personal power and personal wealth.

    The truth is that the man whose life was money had no interest in money. He refused to take increases in pay and spurned every bonus. He banned insider trading. Shortly after retiring in 1945, when he found himself in danger of becoming a millionaire, he set up a foundation and gave it half his personal fortune.

    And the little bank for the ordinary man that he founded?

    The Bank of America.

    news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_ne...7861397.stm
  • Re: The Silent Engines Of Revolution

    Mon, February 2, 2009 - 11:46 AM
    "Too Big to Fail:" a Bailout Hoax

    * How Schemes to Rescue Wall Street Gamblers Are Prolonging this Recession
    By ISMAEL HOSSEIN-ZADEH
    Counterpunch, January 30, 2009
    Straight to the Source

    Using the "too big to fail" scare tactic, the U.S. government has kept a number of terminally ill Wall Street gamblers on an expensive life-support system that is estimated to cost taxpayers $8.5 trillion [1]. In light of the fact that (according to IRS Data Book) there were 138 million taxpayers in 2007, this figure represents a burden of $61,594.20 per tax payer. Or, to put it differently, it represents a burden of $28,333.33 per man, woman and child for the entire U.S. population.

    This massive giveaway of public money has been devoted to a wide range of fraudulent programs, including asset purchases of insolvent institutions, loans and loan guarantees, equity purchases in troubled financial companies, tax breaks for banks, assistance to a relatively small number of struggling homeowners, and a currency stabilization fund.

    The rationale behind this unprecedented taxpayer rip-off is that the current economic crisis is largely due to the ongoing credit crunch in financial markets; and that government injection of money into financial institutions will help unfreeze the credit market by absorbing toxic assets off their balance sheets.

    Despite the massive infusion of public money into the coffers of Wall Street giants, however, the banking industry has shown no interest in lending. Government's showering mega banks with taxpayers' money is thus very much like throwing people's money into a black hole without any questions asked as to where it all ended up, or how it was spent. Not surprisingly, the credit crunch continues unabated and economic conditions deteriorate out of control.

    The question is why? If "illiquidity is the core economic problem," as policy makers argue, why is then the government's injection of enormous amounts of liquidity failing to unfreeze the credit market?

    The answer is that government policy makers, Wall Street financial gamblers, and the mainstream media are misrepresenting the ongoing financial difficulties as a problem of illiquidity or lack of cash. In reality, however, it is not a problem of illiquidity or lack of cash, but of insolvency or lack of trust and, therefore, of hoarding cash. The current credit crunch is a symptom, not a cause, of the paralyzed, unreliable financial markets.

    John Maynard Keynes, the well-known British economist, attributed this type of credit crunch to what he called "liquidity trap," not lack of liquidity, implying that under market conditions of widespread insolvency and distrust lending comes to a standstill not because money is scarce but because it is hoarded, or "trapped," as a safe instrument of preserving assets.

    The theory of "liquidity trap" has been corroborated by empirical evidence from the Great Depression of the 1930s, as well as from the recent financial difficulties in Japan-known as "Japan's lost decade." It is also evidenced in the current credit crunch in global markets.

    There is strong evidence that major money-center banks (such as Citigroup and Bank of America) that have received huge sums of the bailout money are technically bankrupt, but they are not declared as such out of a fear that it may cause turbulence in global financial markets. "Here is the ugly, unofficial truth that neither Wall Street nor the government will acknowledge: the pinnacle of the US financial system is broke-with perhaps $2 trillion in rotten financial assets on the books. Nobody knows, exactly. The bankers won't say, and regulators won't ask, or at least don't dare tell the public" [2].

    By virtue of years of Wall Street's expanding bubble, which came to a burst in the late 2007 and early 2008, these banks managed to accumulate huge sums of fictitious capital on their balance sheets. However, since there is no transparency and the extent of toxic assets thus accumulated is not disclosed, nobody really knows the amount of the worthless assets that are hidden in the books of major Wall Street banks and brokerage houses [3].

    One thing is certain, however: the amount of these toxic assets is in terms of trillions or (as some experts point out) tens of trillions of dollars [4]. There is simply not enough money-in the United States or in the entire world-to bailout these toxic assets. Although not many people know of this fraudulently kept secret, the banks of course know it. And that's why inter-bank lending has come to a standstill, as the banks do not trust each other or, for that matter, businesses and consumers.

    This explains what happened to hundreds of billions of bailout dollars that government bestowed upon Wall Street mega banks: they simply grabbed the loot and stashed it into their coffers, without dispensing a single penny of it as credit to businesses or consumers.

    It also explains the continued freeze of credit markets and the ongoing financial or market stalemate: neither the giant financial institutions (in collusion with government policy makers) are willing to accept the consequences of their gambling policies and submit to their deserved fate of bankruptcy; nor is there enough money to bailout all of their toxic assets.

    Either of these two options could remove the massive toxic assets from financial markets and restore confidence in lending. But since the former alternative is not acceptable to the powerful financial interests and the latter option is not feasible due to insufficient money to buy a ton of worthless assets, the oppressive debt overhang continues to keep credit markets frozen and the economy paralyzed-hence, the persistent stalemate and prolonged crisis.

    In a subtle but real sense, this stalemate is a reflection of two opposing forces: on the one side stand the competitive forces of market mechanism that require exposure, transparency and the cleansing of the balance sheets of the insolvent mega banks. On the other side stand the monopolistic power of these financial giants, supported by government policy makers, that is preventing the forces of competition from determining the value of their toxic assets.

    The apparent rationale behind the refusal to acknowledge the bankruptcy of Wall Street mega banks is that they are "too big to fail," implying that admission of their failure may cause major turbulence in global financial markets. A closer examination of this claim reveals, however, that it is more of a scare tactic designed to protect the powerful interests vested in these financial giants than a genuine rationale to protect national interests.

    While it is true that exposing Wall Street mega banks for what they are-bankrupt-may cause a severe short-term jolt to global financial markets, such a short-term turbulence would be a necessary price to pay for a "clean break" from the current financial stalemate and a long, protracted economic malaise. It would also serve as an effective way to prevent massive redistribution of resources from taxpayers to Wall Street gamblers. In the history of socio-economic developments such cataclysmic but inescapable shocks are variously called "regenerative or creative destruction," "shock therapy," or "birth pangs" of a new dawn and a fresh start.

    The alternative to a painful but swift cleansing of the mega banks' toxic assets is to keep these technically bankrupt banks on a financial life-support system that, like parasites, would suck taxpayers' metaphorical blood, drain national resources, and eventually corrupt or devalue the dollar. What's more, there is no timeframe as to how long these mega banks should or would be kept on the costly crutches provided by the taxpayers, which means the financial stalemate and economic paralysis can go on for a long time. Two historical precedents can be instructive here.

    In the face of the Great Depression of the 1930s, the Hoover administration, using the "too big to fail" scare tactic currently used to bail out the insolvent Wall Street Gamblers, created the Reconstruction Finance Corporation that showered the influential bankers with public money in an effort to save them from bankruptcy. All it did, however, was to postpone the inevitable fate of the banking industry: almost all of the banks failed after nearly three years of extremely costly bailouts policies.

    In a similar fashion, when in the mid- to late-1990s major banks in Japan faced huge losses following the bursting of the real estate and/or lending bubble in that country, the Japanese government embarked on a costly rescue plan of the troubled banks in the hope of "creating liquidity" and "revitalizing credit markets." The results of the bailout plan have been disastrous.

    Although the amount of sour assets has never been disclosed, it is obvious (in retrospect) that such worthless assets must have been colossal. For despite a number of huge bailout giveaways, no noticeable improvement in the ailing conditions of Japan's troubled banks is visible.

    Not surprisingly, more than a decade after the debt overhang of Japan's troubled banks first came to surface in 1997-98, most of the affected banks continue to be vulnerable, the nation's credit market still suffers from a lack of trust, and the broader economic activity remains anemic.

    So, the undisclosed, tightly-kept-secret tons of toxic assets simply cannot be bailed out. Not only will efforts to do so fail, they are also bound to make things worse by draining public finance, redistributing national resources in favor of incompetent and irresponsible financial institutions, accumulating national debt, weakening national currency, and prolonging economic crisis.

    Only by burying the oppressive deadweight of mountains of fictitious assets and cleansing the market off their toxic effects can trust be restored in credit markets. This requires opening the books of the troubled financial institutions and letting them go belly up if they are technically bankrupt. As William Greider of The Nation magazine puts it, "Facing facts will be painful, but it's better than continuing a costly charade" [5].

    The current policy of keeping the toxic assets of insolvent financial institutions on costly crutches is nothing short of price fixing. The logical way to realistically evaluate the price of these assets is, therefore, to do away with the current policy of price fixing and let market forces determine the price. As Mike Whitney points out,

    The appropriate way to establish a price for complex securities in a frozen market is to create a central clearinghouse where they can be auctioned off to highest bidder. That establishes a baseline price, which is crucial for stimulating future sales. . . . Bernanke [the head of the Federal Reserve Bank] would be better off letting the market decide what these debt-instruments are really worth. There are always buyers if the price is right [6].

    While pulling the plug on the insolvent banks and letting them go belly up may cause short term convulsions in financial markets, it will have several advantages that would far outweigh such temporary pains.

    To begin with, this would shorten the wrenching economic crisis and usher in a clean start. Second, it would avoid rewarding mismanagement, inefficiency and irresponsibility. As Jim Rogers, founder of the Quantum Fund, points out:

    What is outrageous economically and is outrageous morally is that normally in times like this, people who are competent and who saw it coming and who kept their powder dry go and take over the assets from the incompetent. . . . What's happening this time is that the government is taking the assets from the competent people and giving them to the incompetent people and saying, now you can compete with the competent people. It is horrible economics.

    "Governments are making mistakes. They're saying to all the banks, you don't have to tell us your situation. You can continue to use your balance sheet that is phony . All these guys are bankrupt, they're still worrying about their bonuses, they're still trying to pay their dividends, and the whole system is weakened [7].

    Many smaller but financially sound regional and community banks could greatly benefit from the opportunity to buy out the realistic, market-based or devalued assets of the insolvent mega banks. Not only will this benefit the healthier financial institutions, it will also lighten taxpayers' bailout burden.

    Third, in light of the fact that the bailout giveaway dollars represent a subtle redistribution of national resources from taxpayers to Wall Street gamblers, declaring these gamblers bankrupt would protect taxpayers from having to shoulder the costly bailout burdens, thereby helping to protect the nation from further plunging into debt. There is absolutely no reason why taxpayers should bailout giant banks, insurance companies, investment banks, and hedge funds.

    Indeed, for all the money that the government is (or would be) paying for the insolvent banks' toxic assets, taxpayers could actually own those banks if they are let to be priced according to realistic market values, which are bound to be only a small fraction of their inflated book values.

    For example, in exchange for the $20 billion bailout money that the Citigroup received on November 23rd, 2008, the government/taxpayers could technically take the possession of the bank since its net market worth at the time was estimated to be only equal to $20.5 billion-down from $255 billion in mid 2007 [8].

    But Citigroup has received much more than $20 billion of taxpayers' money. The $20 billion injection was in addition to the $25 billion the company had received the month before (October 2008) under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). More importantly, at the same time that Citigroup received the $20 billion injection, it also "received $306 billion of U.S. government guarantees for troubled mortgages and toxic assets to stabilize the bank after its stock fell 60 percent last week" [9].

    Obviously, this means that, while Citigroup's ownership remains legally in the existing private hands, taxpayers have, in fact, paid for the company's net market value of $20.5 billion 17 times over with the $351 billion paid to date (351 = 20 + 25 + 306).

    With varying degrees, what is true in the case of Citigroup is also true in the case of a number of other mega banks. For example, Bank of America has received $45 billion cash and $118 billion worth of guarantees against bad assets. Yet, its market value as of January 20th, 2009, was estimated to be only $33 billion-down from $228 billion in mid-2007 [10] This means that, like the case of Citigroup, taxpayers have purchased (paid for) Bank of America many times over.

    That the ownership of these banks remains, nonetheless, in the existing private hands is indicative of the fact that government policy makers are more committed to the interests of Wall Street gamblers than those of taxpayers.

    In the absence of corrupt, incestuous Wall Street-government relationship (including the new, Obama administration), nationalization of insolvent financial institutions is not as complicated or difficult as it sounds. It is certainly easier than public ownership and management of manufacturing enterprises that require much more than record keeping and following regulatory or legal guidelines. "Nationalizing the banks sounds more radical than it is, since banking law already empowers regulators to impose extraordinary controls and close supervision over troubled institutions" [11].

    The idea of nationalizing banks under conditions of a financial meltdown is not necessarily socialistic or ideological. It has, indeed, been occasionally used to deliver capitalism from its own systemic sins. Thus, in the face of the Great Depression of the 1930s, and following the Hoover administration's failed policy of trying to bailout the insolvent banks, the FDR administration was compelled to declare a "bank holiday" in 1933, pull the plug on the terminally-ill banks and (temporarily) take control of the entire financial system.

    Likewise, in the face of the collapse of its banking system in early 1992, the Swedish state assumed ownership and control of all the insolvent banks in an effort to revive its financial system and prevent it from bringing down its entire economy. While this wiped out the existing shareholders, it turned out to be a good deal for taxpayers: not only did it avoid costly redistributive bailouts in favor of the insolvent banks, it also brought taxpayers some benefits once banks returned to profitability.

    Both in Sweden and the United States once profitibility was returned to insolvent banks (following policies of nationalization), their ownership was once again returned to private hands! It is perhaps this kind of government commitment to powerful financial-corporate interests that has prompted a number of critics to argue that one definition of capitalism is that it is a system of socializing losses and privatizing profits [12].

    This is, indeed, a classical political economy argument, maintaining that "in the advanced capitalist societies, what actually happens is that state policies assure that more resources flow to the rich than to the poor. . . . The term corporate welfare is widely used to describe the bestowal of favorable treatment to particular corporations by the government. One of the most commonly raised forms of criticism are statements that the capitalist political economy toward large corporations allows them to 'privatize profits and socialize losses'," [13].

    Few governments in the world have been so utterly under the influence of corporate-financial interests as in the United States. According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), two-thirds of corporations in America paid no federal income taxes at all between 1998 and 2005. This includes a fourth of all large US companies (those with assets worth of $250 million or more). An earlier GAO report showed that 61 per cent of US corporations paid no federal income taxes between 1996 and 2000-a period of high growth and huge corporate profits [14].

    After reviewing these and similar statistics, which indicate a steady redistribution of national resources from the bottom up since the early 1980s, P. Sainath, author of Everybody Loves a Good Drought, wrote: "There's 'corporate governance' for you-they simply run the country. Administrations exist. Corporations govern" [15].

    There are strong indications that Barack Obama's administration is no exception to this pattern-all the promises of change and elevated hopes notwithstanding. Of course, this is not to deny the truly historic importance of his election, an event or victory that should be celebrated as such.

    Nor is it meant to deny or downplay the importance of a number of reforms he was elected to bring about. These would include improvements in largely non-economic (or non-class) issues and areas such as civil liberties, the environment, regulatory issues, race relations, diplomatic protocols, and so on-areas that would rehabilitate some of the excesses and damages done by George W. Bush without burdening powerful financial-corporate interests.

    Obama's changes, however, would not include some of the more fundamental economic or class issues such as reversing or stopping the costly bailout giveaways to Wall Street gamblers and nationalizing the insolvent banks, downsizing the military establishment and reallocating part of the military to non-military public spending, implementing an affordable universal healthcare program, reversing the excessive neoliberal tax cuts for the wealthy, and the like.

    Obama's commitment to powerful business interests is best reflected in his unwavering support for giant Wall Street gamblers. Instead of calling for dismissal and accountability of the economic team of advisors that played a catalyst role in bringing about this systemic financial meltdown, he has placed them in decision-making positions, ensuring the continuance of the failed Bush policies of looting taxpayers and giving it to Wall Street financial titans.

    The longer his administration (in concert with the labial congress) continues on this doomed path, the longer the crisis, the more indebted the nation, and the more oppressive the economic hardship will get.

    There is some speculation that the Obama administration might be compelled to nationalize the insolvent banks. Considering the financial-economic team of neoliberal advisors who would be in charge of carrying out the rumored nationalization, this measure would be committed largely to the powerful Wall Street interests. If implemented, the measure would be tantamount to the proverbial palace coup designed to salvage the rule of the royal family, that is, of the financial Kleptocracy.

    There is no indication that, in the process of the rumored bank nationalization, there would be a seat around the decision-making table for taxpayer representation, or any room for public oversight and control of the nationalization policies and procedures. Instead, as pointed out by Jerry White, "taxpayers would assume responsibility for the worthless assets held by the banking giants so they could take these liabilities off their books and once again become profitable. After a temporary period of government direction, the banks would be turned over once again to private investors, who would buy the now lucrative shares for pennies on the dollar" [16].

    While representing an improvement over the currently-confused bailout/rescue plans, this kind of (Wall Street-Sponsored) bank nationalization would not be able to wipe out all of the worthless assets of the insolvent banks and bring about an effective economic recovery, as it would not break free from the fraudulent influence of powerful financial interests.

    Only a swift and unadulterated nationalization that does not pay taxpayers' cash for gamblers' trash would be able to cleanse the badly tainted financial markets of the gamblers toxic assets, shorten economic pains and cut taxpayers' losses. By bringing the insolvent banks under public control (independent of the Treasury or the Fed that have abundantly proven to be representing the interests of Wall Street giants, not the people), this measure can then lead to the issuance of loans at reasonable rates by the thus nationalized banks, thereby unfreezing credit markets and rekindling investment and economic activity.

    Furthermore, by allowing insolvent homeowners to pay affordable mortgage installments based on reduced or realistic home prices, this alternative would help citizens facing the specter of homelessness stay in their homes, thereby also gradually restoring trust in the mortgage market.

    This type of nationalization of insolvent banks would, of course, require new politics on the part of the people who are suffering the most from the daunting economic hardship but do not seem to have a voice or representation in the fraudulent process of the bailout scam, which means the overwhelming majority of the American people.

    The new politics has to go beyond the traditional channels of demanding change. It needs to draw upon the lessons of the protest movements of the 1930s that squeezed all kinds of economic guarantees and social safety net programs (known as the New Deal reforms) out of the Congress and the FDR administration.

    The financial-corporate governments rarely, if at all, carry out grassroots-targeted reforms voluntarily. Only people pressure, pressure that would include a sustained and widespread protest movement, that is, pressure that would threaten the status quo, can bring about reforms that would benefit the grassroots.

    Ismael Hossein-zadeh, author of the recently published The Political Economy of U.S. Militarism (Palgrave-Macmillan 2007), teaches economics at Drake University, Des Moines, Iowa.

    www.organicconsumers.org/artic...88.cfm

Recent topics in "Year 2025"

Topic Author Replies Last Post
poem Uncle Grundig 0 February 2, 2010
Spiritual Body and Celestial Earth (redux) Michael 3 January 23, 2010
THE SEVEN RAYS - What Are They? by RLP VidasVeron 0 December 19, 2009
Good tribe this John 1 June 16, 2009
The Medicine Wheel Auton 1 February 2, 2009